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Executive summary 
This Evidence Report identifies and explains the central factors driving China’s policies 
towards Southeast Asia. It examines China’s foreign relations through the perspective of 
foreign policy. In this context, as the title indicates, the report gathers together and evaluates 
the evidence on China’s role as a development actor in this neighbouring region. 
The study aims to contribute to evidence-based policy deliberation, formulation and 
implementation. It finds that, since the accession of President Xi Jinping, Southeast Asia has 
gained additional importance for Chinese foreign relations as a key region in China’s new 
‘neighbourhood policy’ and the twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative. 
China’s economic cooperation and its development assistance are said (by the Chinese 
government) to provide investment and logistical know-how, skills and experience to 
undertake infrastructure capacity building in Southeast Asia. Yet the strength of Sino-regional 
relations is tempered by continuing tensions. These include unresolved territorial disputes, 
China’s unilateral action in declaring an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South 
China Sea, and growing concerns over weaknesses in Chinese corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). 
This report concludes that: (1) Southeast Asia’s policy portfolio would be strengthened 
through enhanced multilateral and national economic diversification strategies; (2) Sino-
regional development partnerships can draw upon the new post-2015 global development 
agenda to strengthen trilateral cooperation; and (3) civil society should be engaged as a full 
partner in policy determination. 
 
Box 0.1 Policy implications 
● Foreign and development policies towards Southeast Asia are increased priorities for China 
under President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang. 
● China’s ‘neighbourhood policy’ reflects a more proactive and innovative approach to 
regional relations and is auguring in a new diplomacy. 
● This new diplomacy is evident in the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) and Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) initiatives. 
● China’s approach to international development (or ‘foreign aid’) is relatively new and still 
evolving, but differs substantially from traditional donors. 
● China provides significant levels of investment for infrastructure capacity building, but this is 
tailored to Southeast Asia’s development needs. 
● Weighted against this investment are the negative costs of weak corporate social 
responsibility, and social and economic dislocation and environmental degradation 
associated with Chinese-backed and operated projects. 
● Sino-Southeast Asian relations will remain problematic until there is a resolution to 
longstanding territorial disputes and regionally destabilising Chinese unilateralism. 
● Southeast Asian governments and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)1 
should seek to maximise their countervailing bargaining power with China through: (1) 
systematic adoption of diversification policies and strategies; (2) actively promoting a ‘value 
chains for development’ policy; and (3) bringing civil society into all stages of policy 
development and operationalisation. 
● China, ASEAN and Southeast Asia’s least developed countries (LDCs) should utilise the 
opportunities presented by the post-2015 global development agenda and Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) to scale-up triangular cooperation in the region. 
  
                                               
1 ASEAN members are: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
and Vietnam. 
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1 Introduction 
China’s presence and role in Southeast Asia, as in other regions of the world, is both 
substantial and highly controversial. There are divided opinions over China’s motives as well 
as the scale and impact of its involvement. Regional governments are caught in a dilemma 
between the need for Chinese investment, project know-how and political goodwill on the 
one hand and, on the other, the potential pitfalls and constraints of over-dependency. 
This report identifies and explores the main factors driving China’s policies towards 
Southeast Asia. It examines China’s foreign relations through the perspective of foreign 
policy. In this context, as the title indicates, the report gathers and evaluates the available 
evidence on China as a development actor in this neighbouring region. The study aims to 
contribute to Chinese and Southeast Asian policy deliberation, formulation and 
implementation, with a view to maximising the development benefits accruing to the region 
from China’s engagement, while also minimising or avoiding potential costs. 
1.1 The central issue 
China is now the world’s second largest economy, having overtaken Japan in terms of 
nominal gross domestic product (GDP) (The Economist 2010). In the past decade, China’s 
trade, capital and corporations have ‘gone global’, reaching across every continent. Two 
aspects of this emergence are of particular interest and significance. 
● First, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) set out China’s aim to: ‘facilitate 
good neighbourship and practical cooperation with the neighbouring countries, 
safeguard regional peace and stabilisation, promote common development and 
prosperity’ (CBI 2011). Under President Xi, China has initiated a ‘neighbourhood’ 
(zhoubian or 周边) policy in its foreign relations with states in contiguous regions, 
including Southeast Asia. The declared purpose of the policy is to help meet ‘mutual’ 
goals of Chinese national rejuvenation and regional sustainable development (China 
Daily 2013). 
 Two major policy initiatives, discussed in detail later in this report, are central – and 
indeed potentially critical – to this approach. The first is the twin Continental and 
Maritime Silk Road or ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative. This has two 
interrelated aspects: a land-based Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and a sea-based 
twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). The project’s vision is for the eventual 
integration of the economies along its path into a cohesive economic area. The 
second major policy initiative is the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB). The Bank’s raison d’être is to provide much-needed investment in 
infrastructure capacity building in the Asia-Pacific region. 
● Second, China is establishing itself as a major source of international development 
assistance or ‘foreign aid’. While the level of China’s foreign aid is growing steadily, it 
remains relatively small compared to the United States (US) and other traditional 
donors (see Figure 1.1). 
According to China’s Foreign Aid White Paper 2014, its foreign aid budget totalled US$14bn 
for foreign assistance from 2010 to 2012. This was directed to 121 countries, including 51 in 
Africa, 30 in Asia, 19 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 12 in Europe and 9 in Oceania. As 
Figure 1.2 shows, it was disbursed through grants, interest-free loans and concessional 
loans (Government of China 2014). 
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Figure 1.1 China’s foreign aid in international context 
 
Source: Adapted from DevPolicy (n.d.), cited in Murphy (2014). 
Figure 1.2 Breakdown of China’s foreign aid 
 
Source: Adapted from Brant (2014). 
China is working with international organisations such as the United Nations Office of South-
South Cooperation (UNOSSC) and has been engaged with the post-2015 global 
development agenda and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Both in its own right, and 
as an initiating member of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), China is seen as offering an alternative, largely 
‘without strings’, to the international development assistance provided by ‘traditional’ donor 
countries and international institutions. The White Paper 2014 stated that: ‘When providing 
foreign assistance, China adheres to the principles of not imposing any political conditions, 
not interfering in the internal affairs of the recipient countries and fully respecting their right to 
independently choosing their own paths and models of development’ (Government of China 
2014: 1). 
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This study examines these policies and initiatives with respect to China’s relationship with 
Southeast Asia – a region of substantial economic growth with some high-income economies 
but also lower-income economies and continuing development challenges. Taken as a 
group, as noted above, the Southeast Asian economies are strong in global terms. Two of 
the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Laos and Cambodia, have made major strides to 
exceed the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving poverty by 2015 (UN 2015). 
Since the transition to civilian rule in 2011, Myanmar has been in the midst of profound 
economic and political reforms designed to rebuild its economy, cut poverty and end inter-
ethnic conflicts. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s 
Development Centre predicts GDP growth rates of over 7 per cent for these three economies 
in 2015 and 2016. Myanmar is expected to have the highest growth in the region (7.9 per 
cent in both years), driven by foreign direct investment as well as reforms. Laos is predicted 
to record growth rates of 7.4 per cent in 2015 and 7.5 per cent in 2016. Cambodia is 
expected to see strong growth of 7.2 per cent in both 2015 and 2016 (OECD 2015: 2). Yet 
major development challenges remain. GDP per capita differs widely across the region. As 
Table 1.1 indicates, the lowest GDP incomes are in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, while 
Singapore and Brunei have some of the highest incomes in the world. 
Table 1.1 Southeast Asia GDP per capita 2014 (country and US$) 
Singapore 82,762 
Brunei 73,233 
Malaysia 24,654 
Thailand 14,354 
Indonesia 10,640.901 
Philippines 6,961.630 
Vietnam 5,634.905 
Laos 4,986.713 
Myanmar 4,706.001 
Cambodia 3,262.555 
China 12,880 
Note: GDP based on purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita. 
Source: IMF-World Bank, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2015, 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/index.aspx (accessed 25 December 2015). 
In terms of Human Development Index (HDI) rankings, Thailand, Cambodia, Lao PDR, the 
Philippines and Vietnam are all ranked as medium, as indeed is China, while Myanmar is 
classified as low (UNDP Myanmar 2013: 8). There remains a need for major investment, 
knowledge and skills transfers, and access to value-added roles in regional and global value 
chains. In September 2014, Li Yao, Chief Executive of the China-ASEAN Investment 
Cooperation Fund (CAF), commented that: ‘Without infrastructure no country can achieve 
sustainable growth… Infrastructure is the key for an economy to achieve efficiency’ (China 
Daily 2014). According to one estimate, East Asia, including ASEAN, needs an extra 
US$600bn in infrastructure investment (China Daily 2014). 
After years of relative complacency, China’s neighbourhood policy is renewing the country’s 
relations with this region. This renewed interest and attention reflects China’s re-evaluation, 
under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, of how its national economic, political and 
strategic interests are interwoven in the regions of its ‘near abroad’. As the analysis below 
will illustrate, these national interests centre on: (1) gaining reliable access to critical energy, 
natural resources and strategic minerals to meet China’s growth priorities while expanding 
trade and promoting offshore manufacturing platforms in lower-cost economies; (2) ensuring 
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political stability in this neighbouring region to facilitate economic and strategic objectives 
and (in the case of geographically contiguous neighbours) to counter ‘spillover’ into China of 
ethnic conflicts on its borders; and (3) securing China’s extended lines of supply and 
counterbalancing the US strategic influence in the region. 
In terms of China’s development role and impact in Southeast Asia, the Chinese 
government’s basic policy premise is that its own experience demonstrates that sustainable 
development is driven principally by the levers of economic cooperation. China’s trade, direct 
investment and technical assistance are, therefore, potentially important means for 
Southeast Asia’s economic development. However, regional support is more ambiguous and 
contingent than might at first appear. Relations are also influenced by continued tensions 
over territorial disputes and emerging concerns over the potentially adverse impact of 
China’s growing presence on the region’s economies, social relations and the political-
strategic balance. 
The central policy concerns are threefold: 
1. For China: How can China define its approach and implementation of foreign and 
development policies in order to ensure robust compliance with its core declared 
principles, including ‘non-interference’, mutuality and reciprocity, as enshrined in 
statements dating back to the 1950s? How can it ensure compliance with its 
international commitments to the SDGs, addressing climate change, and pursuing 
South-South Cooperation? 
2. For Southeast Asia: With respect to negotiating or bargaining power between China 
and the Southeast Asian governments (singularly and also collectively within 
ASEAN), how can the regional actors gain leverage or countervailing power against 
the Chinese economic giant? 
3. For the wider international community: What constructive role should the international 
community play in contributing to both regional and Chinese interests? In its most 
simplistic and unhelpful formulation, it might be presented as a stark choice between 
being competitor or collaborator. However, in practice, it is a complex interweaving of 
both elements simultaneously, most evidently in emerging trilateral development 
projects. Triangular cooperation ‘involves Southern-driven partnerships between two 
or more developing countries supported by a developed country(ies)/or multilateral 
organization(s) to implement development cooperation programmes and projects’ 
(UNOSSC, n.d.). China is involved in South-South Cooperation (SSC) in various 
ways, including through the China South-South Cooperation Network and specific 
projects such as the Lancang Mekong Sub-regional Cooperation Programme. 
However, China’s trilateral cooperation work is embryonic, and there is a significant 
opportunity to scale up its efforts within the context of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development and SDG 17, ‘Strengthen the means of implementation and 
revitalise the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development’ – specifically Targets 
17.6 (‘enhance North-South, South-South and triangular regional and international 
cooperation…’) and 17.9 (‘enhance international support for implementing effective 
and targeted capacity-building in developing countries’) (UNDESA 2015). 
This study examines China’s neighbourhood policy and, within that context, its development 
approach. China’s specific interests are identified, explained and assessed. In examining 
these interests, the study seeks to gain a deeper understanding of the economic, political, 
environmental, cultural and strategic interests at the heart of China’s evolving policies 
towards Southeast Asia. This, in turn, provides an important new reference point for 
Southeast Asian policies towards China. 
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2 China’s approach to Southeast Asia 
2.1 China and Southeast Asia 
Southeast Asia is of key importance to China for access to critical energy and natural 
resources. The region is also significant as a potential conduit for the promotion of China’s 
diplomatic influence and for its strategic role as a vital crossroads of sea and land. The 
countries and peoples of Southeast Asia have traditionally formed an important part of 
China’s trading, cultural and demographic outlook (Stuart-Fox 2003; Tagliacozzo and Chang 
2011). 
China’s main motivation for involvement in Southeast Asia is to further its national economic, 
political and strategic interests, each of which is important in its own right to Beijing’s 
definition of its core national needs. From the Chinese government’s perspective, this is not 
inconsistent with mutuality and development, and should not be viewed as ‘zero-sum’. 
In other words, the Chinese government sees China as contributing to both the short-term 
needs and the sustained long-term development and economic growth of its partners. In the 
Chinese worldview, its businesses and state assistance bring investment, knowledge, skills, 
jobs and incomes, as well as access to Chinese corporate value chains and markets. China 
maintains that this creates invaluable national income and vital human and material capacity 
for economic and social development (Government of China 2014). The reasons for this 
stance become evident if we review the economic, political, cultural and strategic dimensions 
of the Chinese presence in the Southeast Asia region. 
2.1.1 Economic relations 
China’s trade and investment profile in Southeast Asia is already substantial. This is well 
illustrated if we take a look at trade (Table 2.1) and investment (Table 2.2) between China 
and the top six of the ten ASEAN economies. 
Table 2.1 Key indicators on ASEAN-China relations (2014): trade 
 US$bn Ranking Imports and exports 
(US$bn) 
Year-on-year increase 
over 2013 (%) 
ASEAN’s 
investment to 
China  
(total in 2014) 
6.3 China’s 
investment to 
ASEAN  
(total in 2014) 
5.88 8.3 
China’s trade with 
Malaysia 
102.02 1 Imports from China: 46.36 
Exports to China: 55.66 
3.8 
China’s trade with 
Vietnam 
83.64 2 Imports from China: 63.74 
Exports to China: 19.9 
27.7 
China’s trade with 
Singapore 
79.74 3 Imports from China: 48.91 
Exports to China: 30.83 
5.0 
China’s trade with 
Thailand 
72.67 4 Imports from China: 34.29 
Exports to China: 38.38 
2.0 
China’s trade with 
Indonesia 
63.58 5 Imports from China: 39.06 
Exports to China: 24.52 
7.0 
China’s trade with 
the Philippines 
44.45 6 Imports from China: 23.47 
Exports to China: 20.98 
16.8 
Source: ASEAN-China Centre, based on Statistics of the General Administration of Customs of China, www.asean-china-
center.org/english/2015-04/10/c_134140759.htm (accessed 15 February 2016). 
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Table 2.2 Key indicators on ASEAN-China relations (2014): investment 
 US$bn  US$bn 
ASEAN-China bilateral investment 
(total, as at December 2014) 
126.95 China’s investment to ASEAN  
(total, as at December 2014) 
35.2 
ASEAN-China investment  
(total, January to December 2014) 
12.18   
ASEAN’s investment to China  
(total in 2014) 
6.3 China’s investment to ASEAN  
(total in 2014) 
5.88 
Source: ASEAN-China Centre, based on statistics from Ministry of Commerce, www.asean-china-center.org/english/2015-
04/10/c_134140759.htm (accessed 15 February 2016). 
China’s economic interest in the Southeast Asia region is quite clear, as it is an important 
source of raw materials such as timber. Quite apart from illegal timber exports, the legitimate 
trade has been booming on the back of rising Chinese consumer demand. According to 
official Vietnamese statistics, wood exports totalled US$5.37bn in 2013 – a 15.2 per cent 
increase from 2012. Over the past ten years, the Vietnamese wood industry has expanded 
rapidly, with an average export growth rate of 15.5 per cent every year. China is one of the 
principal destinations. This leaves Vietnam caught in a quandary, between the attraction of 
export-led growth as one of a range of developmental pathways, while producers could not 
keep up with demand, running out of domestic sources of raw materials and having to import 
wood at high cost. This added to regional competition for raw timber, inflating prices and 
costs of production. This in turn had potential implications for comparative advantage, value 
chain position, market competitiveness and sales volume. 
Southeast Asia is also an increasingly critical supply line for oil and gas drawn from the 
Middle East through the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, and the Indian Ocean. According to 
Richardson (2012): 
China now imports 55 per cent of its oil consumption, a ratio that is set to increase. 
Natural gas, the least polluting of fossil fuels, is on a similar trend line. By 2020, 
China’s gas imports by pipeline and sea will make up nearly 33 per cent of demand, 
up from around 20 per cent now and none in 2006, when China ceased to be self-
sufficient in gas. 
The region is also increasingly attractive for Chinese manufacturers facing increased 
competition for labour and, consequentially, rising costs at home (Bloomberg Business 
2012). China’s labour costs have risen significantly in recent years, by between 15 per cent 
and 20 per cent annually, forcing some Chinese firms to relocate to Southeast Asia (Qingfen 
and Quanlin 2012). Some Southeast Asian economies, such as Vietnam, have cheaper 
labour and production costs and preferential land provision by government (China Daily 
2012). 
Southeast Asia presents a market of more than 600 million people for China’s goods and 
emerging service and financial industries. This is a major draw for Chinese business and 
investors. But it is the expectations of the market that provide the driving force. For Chinese 
firms and the phalanx of supporting quasi-governmental financial agencies such as the 
Export-Import (Exim) Bank, the anticipated growth in the numbers and spending power of 
Asia’s new middle class presents a huge magnet. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
estimates that, by 2030, Asia (East and South) will add 2.5 billion people to the world’s 
middle classes, increasing their spending by 9 per cent each year (Drysdale 2011). 
China’s economic strategy, the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015), is explicit in seeing 
China’s future growth as coming from a strengthening of the domestic market. This includes 
the transfer of labour-intensive manufacturing offshore and upgrading of domestic 
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manufacturing to higher value-added products. In 2012, an unnamed Chinese foreign trade 
official from the Ministry of Commerce was reported as confirming this trend, stating that 
‘nearly one-third of Chinese manufacturers of textiles, garments, shoes and hats’ were 
working ‘under growing pressure’ and had moved all or part of their production outside China 
in what he called ‘the great industry transfer’ (cited in Qingfen and Quanlin 2012). Within 
ASEAN countries, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia were primary destinations for this 
transfer. 
In this scenario, regional development follows on from a Chinese economic engine fuelled by 
strengthening Chinese consumption. This could give an extra spurt for ASEAN and other 
East Asian exports and investment opportunities, particularly as the ASEAN Economic 
Community scheduled for 2015/16 eventually comes into being. It is also supported by the 
tariff exemptions provided through the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) set up in 
2010 (ASEAN 2014). China also made a commitment to conclude negotiations by 2015 on 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade liberalisation scheme, 
which includes ASEAN and the six countries with which it has free trade agreements (Xinhua 
2013b). These negotiations are, however, scheduled to roll on through 2016, with three 
meetings timetabled for the first half of the year (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
2015). 
The Global Economic Outlook 2015 estimated that real GDP growth would be 3.3 per cent, 
despite the slowing of the Chinese economy and the financial turbulence caused by the so-
called ‘Great fall of China’. The Outlook concludes that ‘The Asia-Pacific region remains the 
leader for global growth’ and that ‘Despite short-term headwinds from the global economy, 
Southeast Asia will continue to strengthen to become a global production hub’, with average 
GDP growth predicted at 4.3 per cent in 2015, 4.3 per cent for 2015–19, and 3.9 per cent for 
2020–25 (The Conference Board 2015). 
A brief regional review offers a flavour of China’s regional involvement. Across the region, 
China’s ties are generally robust, although political tensions with the Philippines and Vietnam 
in particular carry some degree of adverse economic impact. China is Indonesia’s second 
largest trading partner, with bilateral trade standing at US$66.2bn in 2012 – four times that of 
2005. Two-way trade in the first half of 2013 hit US$33.84bn, up 4.6 per cent from the same 
period in 2012. In Malaysia, the first seven months of 2013 saw bilateral trade total 
US$59.72bn – a remarkable 14.9 per cent rise over the previous year. In April 2013, China’s 
leading railway car manufacturer, the China South Locomotive and Rolling Stock 
Corporation, began construction of its US$131m ASEAN manufacturing and maintenance 
centre in Malaysia (Xinhua 2013c). 
Premier Li visited Vietnam as part of his October 2013 tour of the region. In 2012, trade 
between the two countries topped more than US$41bn, and in the first eight months of that 
year, bilateral trade stood at US$31.8bn. By the end of August 2013, China had 934 projects 
in Vietnam, with a total recorded capital stock of US$4.79bn, ranking 13th in foreign 
investment. At the time, there were about 13,500 Vietnamese students studying in China, 
and around 3,500 Chinese students being trained in Vietnam. The declared shared goal was 
to increase bilateral trade to US$60bn by 2015. However, reaching this objective proved 
problematic due to the 2014 territorial dispute between the two countries, which sparked 
violence against Chinese firms and workers in Vietnam, and diplomatic clashes. The Chinese 
government’s subsequent decision to ban Chinese state-owned enterprises from bidding for 
new contracts in Vietnam reinforced the downward spiral in relations. However, according to 
Vietnam’s Transport Minister, speaking in June 2014, there were nine Chinese contractors 
with 17 projects valued at approximately US$1.4bn in Vietnam, and most were already more 
than half completed. The Cat Linh-Ha Dong urban elevated train project was funded by 
Chinese official development assistance (ODA) (Vietnam.net 2014). 
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China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner since 2009 and ASEAN has been China’s 
third largest trading partner since 2011. The two-way trade volume reached US$366.5bn in 
2014, representing 4.6 per cent growth on the previous year. Both partners agreed to work 
towards achieving a US$500bn two-way trade volume by the end of 2015, pushing further to 
US$1tn by 2020 (ASEAN 2015). China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) into ASEAN was 
almost US$19bn in 2012. 
China has also established an infrastructure investment bank to promote greater 
interconnectivity in the region – the China-ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund (CAF) – 
pledging an initial US$10bn to it. The stated aim is to promote Chinese infrastructure 
investment throughout Southeast Asia to strengthen connections in roads, railways, water 
transport, telecommunications and energy. As in Africa, however, there are concerns that 
China’s growing impact will distort local production and trade – a factor compounded, in the 
eyes of critics, by CAFTA. The recent consolidation of ASEAN and the creation of the 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) present not only an economic opportunity for China, 
but also a significant political-strategic relationship, one that has been steadily building over a 
substantial period. 
2.1.2 Political and cultural relations 
China’s political relations with its Southeast Asian neighbours have never been easy; 
commercial ties have been offset by territorial, ethnic and ideological disputes as well as 
occasional cross-border or maritime tensions. China’s present-day relations with some of the 
region’s states date back to Zhou Enlai’s bridge-building at the 1955 Bandung Conference 
(with Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, South Vietnam, Thailand, the 
Philippines, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam). The Cold War’s ideological 
competition and the first Indochina war split the region, its countries and peoples, while the 
Sino-Soviet dispute split the region’s Communist parties. Numerous factors contributed to a 
steady albeit at times still uneasy rapprochement. These included Southeast Asia’s post-war 
economic renaissance, the formation of ASEAN (in 1967), China’s dramatic shift to market 
socialism under Deng Xiaoping after 1979, and the country’s subsequent transformation to a 
global economic powerhouse. 
This shift is reified in China’s institutional involvement in ASEAN. China has steadily become 
embedded in the institutional fabric of Southeast Asia. Its diplomatic opening with ASEAN 
began in the early 1990s, becoming a full Dialogue Partner in 1996. Today’s relationship 
dates back to the signing of the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership agreement in 2003. The 
institutionalised architecture is formalised in a series of forums: ASEAN Plus Three (APT), 
the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defence 
Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus). Reciprocal diplomatic missions have been established 
and the ASEAN-China Centre, set up in 2009, operates in Beijing. 
Cooperation has been framed through a series of joint statements, and two Action Plans 
(covering 2005–10 and 2011–15). There are 11 agreed priority areas for cooperation: 
agriculture; information and communications technology (ICT); human resource 
development; Mekong Basin development; investment; energy; transport; culture; public 
health; tourism; and environment. Economically, the headline event was the establishment of 
the 2010 ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (CAFTA). Given the territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea, the flagship yet nonetheless impotent agreement is the Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed in November 2002, with implementation 
guidelines eventually agreed in July 2011 (ASEAN 2002). 
Beyond the formalities, substantial tensions remain. For example, relations between China 
and the Philippines are still at their lowest point for decades, marked by the relative paucity 
of Beijing’s humanitarian assistance in the wake of typhoon Haiyan and clashes in 2014 over 
disputed maritime waters. In addition, Sino-Vietnamese relations fell to a new low point in 
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2014, when the positioning of China’s US$1bn oil rig in contested waters close to the 
disputed Paracel Islands, accompanied by a flotilla of naval, coastguard and civilian ships, 
sparked bitter exchanges and led to anti-Chinese riots (Wen 2014; Daily Telegraph 2014). A 
spokeswoman from the Chinese Foreign Ministry used uncharacteristically blunt language to 
criticise Vietnam: ‘On the one hand, they have been increasing their damaging and 
harassing activities on the scene, while internationally everyone has seen they have been 
unbridled in starting rumours and spreading slander, unreasonably criticising China’ (Brunei 
Times 2014). Such inflammatory rhetoric is unhelpful in promoting constructive dialogue, and 
only serves to entrench the respective parties in antagonistic positions over the short term. 
However, the deployment of such rhetoric is a marker in a number of respects: as a reflection 
of a more assertive China in terms of nationalistic (or ‘patriotic’) expression speaking to 
audiences at home; and as a means of signalling Chinese intent to regional audiences. 
Culturally, there is one significant factor in China’s relationship with Southeast Asia – the 
ethnic Chinese diaspora and the discrimination, resentment, animosity and violence Chinese 
communities have experienced over the centuries. In 1947, for example, the number of 
ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia was estimated at 7 million or around 5 per cent of the 
region’s population (Vandenbosch 1947). In 1956, there were 10 million ethnic Chinese in 
the region, and by 2001, the figure had risen to around 20 million, accounting for one-third of 
the 60 million Chinese people living overseas (BBC News 2001). The most recent estimates 
suggest the number is around 33 million (Malaysian Chinese News 2014). 
Ethnic tensions are prevalent across the region. These include latent anti-Chinese sentiment 
among local communities who perceive that closed communities of ethnic Chinese have 
assimilated into their host countries (huayi) and businesses, and resent their relative 
affluence. These tensions flare up periodically; they were evident most recently in anti-
Chinese riots in Vietnam in May 2014. After the riots, an estimated 60,000 local workers 
became jobless, as many foreign-owned factories were forced to close indefinitely (Du 2014). 
A key consideration here is the Chinese government’s increasing willingness to assert its 
responsibility to ethnic Chinese communities in the Southeast Asian Chinese diaspora and to 
court such communities (Chang 2013). 
2.1.3 Strategic relations 
Strategically, for the United States, the region holds difficult memories, based largely on the 
Indochina war with Vietnam, which drew in Cambodia and Laos. But time moves on, and the 
United States now has diplomatic relations with these countries and, after decades of 
treading water, the Obama administration re-prioritised its involvement with the region. The 
intent behind its renewed regional interest is clear – to reinvigorate its diplomatic presence 
and alliance relationships, maximise its economic position, and counter Chinese strategic 
expansion. 
This was spelled out by US Assistant Secretary at the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, Daniel Russel, who stated in mid-July 2013 that: ‘We are in an extraordinary period 
of growth and prosperity in the Asia Pacific region, and promoting that growth, facilitating it, 
sustaining it, and harnessing it, frankly, is central to America’s economic and strategic 
interest’ (Russel 2013). The US strategy itself received mixed reactions from the Southeast 
Asian states (Bush 2012). However, this ‘re-balancing’ towards the Asia-Pacific region is 
widely viewed as a response to the United States’ own longstanding interests, the region’s 
economic dynamism, China’s growing presence, and the turbulence in its territorial disputes 
(Campbell and Andrews 2013). These latter tensions were exacerbated when, in January 
2014, China unilaterally imposed a new ‘maritime identification zone’, ostensibly a fishing 
exclusion zone, which covers 2 million km2 of the South China Sea and is administered by 
China’s Hainan Province. It provoked an ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ statement of concern, 
citing the breech of international agreements (Asia Pacific Defence Forum 2014); the zone is 
ignored by transiting US vessels. 
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2.2 China’s ‘neighbourhood policy’ 
China is a vast country, but its long and unique history is inextricably intertwined with the 
countries and peoples of its near neighbours in Southeast Asia. In terms of policy, however, 
this is a much more recent facet of China’s relationships with its neighbouring countries. One 
may, perhaps tentatively, see the geopolitical, ideological and strategic involvement of Mao 
Zedong’s China in what was then termed in the West ‘Indo-China’ as based not only on Mao 
Zedong Thought but also on party and State policy. However, as the reform programme 
initiated by Deng Xiaoping took hold in China, and with the economic rise of many Southeast 
Asian countries, the Beijing policy perspective shifted significantly – most notably in relation 
to the ASEAN project. China’s need for investment, production know-how and markets, 
combined with a stable regional environment, underpinned this cooperative approach. 
However, a shifting policy context prompted the Xi leadership, early in its tenure, to focus on 
stronger relationships with this neighbouring region. That context was marked by: continuing 
tensions over territorial disputes; popular unease over the corporate behaviour of some 
Chinese firms; apprehension over the degree to which Southeast Asia’s economies were 
becoming beholden to Chinese interests; the subliminal regional competition emerging 
between China and the US; and a sense, in Chinese policy circles, that policy towards the 
region had drifted in recent years. 
The declared aim is quite straightforward. Initiating the new approach in October 2013, 
President Xi (Xinhua 2013d) stated that: 
‘We must strive to make our neighbours more friendly in politics, economically more 
closely tied to us, and we must have deeper security cooperation and closer people-
to-people ties’. China’s approach would be to treat its neighbours as friends and 
partners, to make them feel safe and to help them develop. A guiding principle was to 
be reciprocity and ‘identifying convergence points for cooperation; making use of 
China’s advantages in economy, trade, technology, and finance and actively taking 
part in regional economic cooperation…’ China would strive for a sound neighbouring 
environment for its own development and seek common development with 
neighbouring countries. In terms of Southeast Asia, the political rhetoric was strongly 
in evidence, with President Xi’s call for China and ASEAN to build a ‘community of 
common destiny’. 
As noted earlier, this shift in focus has prompted China to launch some concrete initiatives. 
Two of the three already identified – the MSR and AIIB – form the cornerstone of China’s 
new diplomacy under the leadership of President Xi. Together, they are likely to be critical in 
reconfiguring the landscape of international relations across a swathe of regions, influencing 
their development for decades to come. 
In China’s official public discourse presented through such organs as the Xinhua News 
Agency (the official press agency of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)), these initiatives 
are held to represent the concrete implementation of the ‘Chinese Dream’ – the vision 
articulated by Xi Jinping in November 2012, just months before he formally took office. The 
Chinese Dream integrates national and personal aspirations, with the twin goals of 
reclaiming national pride and achieving personal wellbeing. It requires sustained economic 
growth, greater equality, and an infusion of cultural values to balance materialism (China 
Daily 2015). 
This leadership vision links past, present and future together in a narrative that is appealing 
and easily recognisable to a national Chinese audience (China Daily 2015). It is easy to 
dismiss such discourses, statements and aspirational visions as ephemeral attempts by 
leaders to put their stamp on history and define their period of office. While this is 
undoubtedly characteristic of President Xi’s ‘Chinese Dream’, it should be understood as 
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much more substantial than that. The discourse of history being constructed here carefully 
builds, as its centrepiece, the long road to economic, political and, most interestingly, now 
cultural freedom. The Chinese Dream is not only about completing China’s revolutionary 
journey from colonial subservience, along the most arduous of roads, to a China that has 
truly ‘stood up’ (in Mao Zedong’s 1949 declaration) – not only in terms of revolutionary 
rhetoric, but emphatically in economic, military and political sovereignty. 
It has become almost commonplace to argue that China’s political system, led by the 
‘vanguard’ of the people – the Communist Party of China (CPC) – is ‘communist’ in name 
only; that the country has relinquished revolutionary political theology to the rapacious 
materialism of consumerism labelled ‘market socialism’, and moved to ‘nationalism’ as the 
glue holding China together and sustaining the CPC’s position. President Xi’s ‘Dream’ and 
the rhetoric his team have deployed in presidential speeches (in public and behind closed 
doors) is about marshalling history to meet the needs of the present. President Xi has made 
considerable efforts to emphasise the importance of Chinese culture to China today and to 
its future, exerting compatriots to demonstrate more pride in China’s culture, civilisation and 
history. It is also an implicit attack on what is held to be a debilitating materialistic Western 
cultural threat to China – a reprise of former leader Deng Xiaoping’s warnings against 
‘spiritual pollution’ from the West, as China opened up to the world. 
All this is highly relevant to China’s approach to its ‘neighbourhood’ and to its role as a new 
development actor. The new narrative represents a powerful influence on the framing of 
China’s worldview, its foreign policy, and its actions. It takes current analysis to the heart of 
the debate over ‘China rising’ – when (not if) it succeeds the US as the most powerful 
economy in the world, what will it do with this power and how will it manage its international 
relationships? 
This is a classic debate for periods of historical ‘shift’ in the international system. Is China a 
‘revolutionary’ state, seeking to replace the global system with one after its own image? Is it 
a ‘reformist’ state seeking to adjust and rebalance the existing system to account for its own 
interests? Or is it a ‘status quo’ state, essentially conforming to the institutionalised norms, 
rules, principles, and values of the existing system? In essence, is the transition to Chinese 
economic, political, military and possibly cultural world leadership going to be ‘peaceful’ (as 
the Beijing government asserts) or acrimonious, even conflictual? 
It may be that China’s emerging assertiveness in driving the AIIB, OBOR, BRICS and BRICS 
New Development Bank, and its ‘alternative’ approach to the idea and practice of 
development, is not supplementary, as President Obama has recently claimed over the 
creation of the AIIB. It may, in fact, be ‘revolutionary’ in creating an alternative, challenging 
new institutional architecture driven by a combination of a new Chinese ‘patriotic’ sense of 
national identity and consequential definition of national interests on the one hand, and a 
sophisticated construction of ideational narratives on the other. These include the 2030 
Sustainable Development Agenda and SDGs, the Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation, and the Paris agreement on climate change. These are packaged 
within China’s avowed commitment to South-South Cooperation, and attaining a 
‘harmonious world’ – a proposition first advanced by then President Hu Jintao at the 17th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2007 (Government of China 2007). 
These initiatives are a reflection of China’s frustration with what it and the other BRICS 
members have stated is a failure to reform the existing global economic and political system 
– one that is structurally weighted in favour of Western states. The AIIB, in particular, is a 
declaration of intent. For China, it presents new opportunities in terms of demonstrated 
international leadership and a new avenue through which to extend its influence. 
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The ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative is China’s flagship initiative under President Xi. It brings 
together two separate but interrelated elements: a land-based Silk Road Economic Belt 
(SREB) and a sea-based twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). The initiative was 
born in September and October 2013 during President Xi’s tours of Central Asia and 
Southeast Asia (Xinhua 2013a). The SREB includes countries situated on the original Silk 
Road through Central Asia, West Asia, the Middle East and Europe. As noted earlier, the 
initiative envisages the integration of the region into a cohesive economic area. This will 
involve investment in infrastructure, widening cultural exchanges, and increasing trade. In 
addition to this area with its obvious historic roots, SREB also includes South Asia and 
Southeast Asia. The MSR is intended to complement the SREB by building partnerships and 
collaborative relations with countries in Southeast Asia, Oceania, and North Africa as the 
‘Road’ traverses the South China Sea, South Pacific and Indian Ocean. 
The MSR remained a relatively amorphous idea until 28 March 2015, when China’s National 
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce 
jointly released an action plan on the principles, framework, and cooperation priorities and 
mechanisms in the SREB and MSR initiative. On that same day, President Xi emphasised 
the importance of the strategy in his speech at the opening ceremony of the 2015 annual 
conference of the Boao Forum for Asia, held in Hainan Province. Earlier in March 2015, in 
trying to distance the MSR project from traditional approaches, Chinese Foreign Minister 
Wang Yi argued that it represented: ‘the product of inclusive cooperation, not a tool of 
geopolitics, and must not be viewed with an outdated Cold War mentality’ (China Daily 
2013). 
OBOR was underpinned not only by a major round of foreign relations trips to neighbouring 
countries and reciprocal visits to Beijing, but also a substantial financial commitment (Li 
2014). In November 2014, President Xi announced that China would contribute US$40bn to 
establish the Silk Road Fund (SRF), to provide investment and financing support for 
infrastructure, resources, industrial cooperation, financial cooperation and other projects in 
countries along the ‘Belt and Road’. 
China’s overall investment commitment to these initiatives totals around US$100bn. In 
addition to the SRF commitment, this includes US$50bn to the AIIB, and an additional 
US$10bn to the BRICS New Development Bank. In China’s view, the SREB and MSR will 
promote trade and investment between China and the countries along both routes. 
According to the McKinsey Global Institute, the projected global need for infrastructure 
investment between 2015 and 2030 is approximately US$57.3tn (Dobbs, Pohl, Lin, Mischke, 
Garemo, Hexter, Matzinger, Palter and Nanavatty 2013). In regard to the Southeast Asian 
sphere, in September 2014, Li Yao, Chief Executive of the CAF, commented that: ‘Without 
infrastructure no country can achieve sustainable growth… Infrastructure is the key for an 
economy to achieve efficiency’ (China Daily 2014). One estimate is that East Asia, including 
ASEAN, needs an extra US$600bn in infrastructure investment (China Daily 2014). 
The AIIB has emerged from an idea first put forward by China in 2013. This led to 
discussions and the formal launch of the proposal in Beijing in October 2014, with the 
Articles of Agreement signed in late June 2015. As its title indicates, the purpose of the Bank 
is to provide much-needed investment in infrastructure capacity building in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Its establishment is a direct response to the identified critical need for large-scale 
investment in many Asia-Pacific countries. The Bank also emerged from China’s 
assessment that the heavy dominance of the US and Japan in the ADB, and the lack of 
progress on reform, meant that an alternative financial institution was needed. 
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2.3 China as a development actor in Southeast Asia 
China’s growing presence and revised foreign policy approach embodied in its 
neighbourhood policy raises the question of what is China’s development role in Southeast 
Asia? The principal economic and diplomatic mechanisms with respect to Sino-ASEAN 
relations are CAFTA, set up in 2010 – an arrangement China has recently proposed should 
be ‘upgraded’ to extend the liberalisation of trade and investment (ASEAN-China Centre 
2015g) – and the 10+1 and 10+3 dialogue frameworks. Of longer-term potential importance 
is the proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), involving 16 
countries that account for almost half of the global population and 30 per cent of global GDP 
(ASEAN-China Centre 2015g). Taken in conjunction with the AIIB and BRICS New 
Development Bank, the RCEP presents another new substantial alternative grouping in the 
Asia-Pacific, and a challenge to the US-sponsored Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). 
In November 2015, Liu Zhenmin, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, announced at a press 
briefing on the sidelines of the 27th ASEAN Summit and Related Summits that China was 
committing US$560m to underdeveloped ASEAN member states in 2016. Further, China 
would also offer infrastructure loans totalling US$10bn to Southeast Asian countries 
(ASEAN-China Centre 2015a). 
The current debate is largely concerned with the character, intentions and impact of China’s 
international development assistance. Clearly, China’s emerging role in international 
development has drawn a large amount of attention and critical evaluation, particularly with 
respect to Africa. This literature focuses on a wide range of issues, including questions 
around whether China can be considered as an alternative development ‘model’ to that of 
traditional donors. There are also questions around ‘conditionality’ or ‘non-interference’ and 
human rights, and how China’s assistance fits within SSC and dialogue. 
Not surprisingly, assessments of China’s role vary widely. Some are outright in their criticism 
and cynicism about China’s motives and practices (Manji and Marks 2007). Others challenge 
orthodoxies surrounding the ‘emerging’ powers (Watson 2014). Others still (Paulo and 
Reisen 2010) adopt a more balanced position, while there are those that argue that China’s 
role and contribution is positive and constructive (Moyo 2009; Shimomura and Ohasi 2013; 
Zimmermann and Smith 2011). A recent collection of analyses is China and International 
Development: Challenges and Opportunities (Gu, Zhang, Li and Bloom 2014). 
China’s role as a major international development actor is, clearly, very recent and its 
thinking and practice remains very much a work in progress. However, to try to provide some 
greater understanding of its thinking and approach, the government in Beijing issued its first 
White Paper on Foreign Aid in April 2011, followed by a second in July 2014 (IOSC 2014). 
The White Papers provide a basis for understanding China’s perspective on international 
development. According to the 2011 White Paper (Xinhua 2011: 4): 
China is the world’s largest developing country, with a large population, a poor 
foundation and uneven economic development. As development remains an arduous 
and long-standing task, China’s foreign aid falls into the category of South-South 
cooperation and is mutual help between developing countries. 
The 2011 White Paper identified five principles that underscore China’s understanding and 
practices of foreign aid: (1) to help recipient countries build up their self-development 
capacity; (2) to refrain from imposing political conditions on provision of assistance; (3) to 
adhere to ‘equality, mutual benefit and common development’; (4) to remain ‘realistic while 
striving for the best’; and (5) to keep pace with the times, paying attention to reform and 
innovation. 
17 
The 2014 White Paper restated these five principles and added another: ‘keeping promise’, 
i.e. a reconfirmation of China’s continuing commitment to its international development. Of 
course, China’s approach has not emerged out of a historical vacuum; it reflects the history 
and challenges experienced by China through its semi-colonial past and tortuous 
revolutionary eras through to the present day. It is this experience that China’s diplomatic 
discourse on development emphasises as a distinctive and differentiating element of shared 
or common heritage with many developing countries; indeed, this has become the 
cornerstone of China’s engagement in South-South dialogue (see Chan 2013 for an 
insightful account). In policy terms, there is much that links today’s thinking and practice to 
historical antecedents – most notably the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the 
Bandung Declaration (and ‘Bandung Spirit’) and the Eight Principles for Economic Aid and 
Technical Assistance to Other Countries promulgated by China’s former premier Zhou Enlai 
in 1964. 
As a consequence of this, China’s approach is grounded within ‘a wider remit of economic 
relations’ (Gu et al. 2014). In other words, China seeks development partnerships as one 
component within the wide range of economic cooperation. Despite the complexities and 
nuances of China’s emerging development discourse and policy framework, five distinct 
characteristics appear evident: 
1. China’s approach to international ‘development’ in the current international system is 
a learning experience. It is establishing its first Development Studies Centre as well 
as working with organisations such as the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) in the Africa-Britain-China (‘A-B-C’) development initiative, and 
the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) in defining its 
approach. The two foreign aid White Papers represent Beijing’s response to 
international calls for greater clarity and transparency in its approach. The ‘traditional’ 
donors’ terms are redefined in China’s political culture. For example, economic 
development aid is subsumed by the overarching concept of ‘economic cooperation’. 
This term is intended to account for the whole spectrum of economic and non-
economic activity; it includes development aid, loans, technical assistance, and state-
sponsored investments. 
2. China’s development discourse keeps faith with its foundational guiding principles 
embedded in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (1955) and the Eight 
Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries (1964). As 
President Xi emphasised in his April 2015 address to the Africa-Asia 60th 
Anniversary Commemoration Summit in Jakarta, China remains committed to the 
principles set out by the 1955 Bandung Conference and to advancing them further 
through inter-regional dialogue (Xinhua 2015). 
 The most controversial of this corpus of foundational principles for China’s current 
role as a ‘new’ or ‘non-traditional’ donor is that of ‘non-interference’ in the sovereign 
affairs of other states, including recipient states with questionable human rights and 
transparency records. The ‘non-interference’ principle is a sine qua non of 
declaratory Chinese foreign and development policies. However, recent research 
suggests that it may be becoming more malleable than is claimed by the Chinese 
government and is often conventionally assumed. The Chinese government, it is 
argued, may be quietly altering its interpretation of this principle and adopting a more 
‘creative involvement’ approach based on three elements: respecting sovereignty; 
consulting on an equal footing; and promoting peace and impartial dialogues (Lu 
2012). This would constitute a case-by-case assessment, rather than the current 
blanket prohibition of actions and statements that may be regarded as interfering in 
the sovereign affairs of its partners. Grounds for such a shift may be found in the 
consequence of burgeoning Chinese business activities and numbers of Chinese now 
living overseas (Duchâtel, Bräuner and Hang 2014: vi). Attacks on Chinese 
businesses or Chinese communities, such as those in Vietnam in 2014, have simply 
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helped define the problem of perceived growing risks to Chinese national assets and 
peoples (whether they be Chinese citizens or members of long-established ethnic 
Chinese communities) that has been seen in Africa. 
3. Governments working with China as development partners must first commit 
themselves to Beijing’s ‘One China’ policy, disavowing Taiwan, before assistance 
will be provided. Cambodia, for example, ended its relationship with Taipei in 2004 
and closed its representative office while accepting a sizeable development loan from 
the mainland. 
4. Related to China’s ‘non-interference’ principle, and equally controversial 
internationally, China’s ‘cooperation’ is often non-conditional in terms of requisite 
reforms intended to improve the partner’s quality of governance. China is often 
criticised as ‘soft’ on its interest rates and repayment schedules and for encouraging 
a ‘binging on debt’, thereby working against the best efforts of the traditional donors. 
Nevertheless, there are still cooperation requirements. These are usually associated 
with the use of Chinese suppliers and materials, imported Chinese workers and 
technical expertise. 
5. China has tended to prefer bilateral relationships in its foreign and development 
policies and practice. But this too is changing, with new drives, first upwards, to 
multilateralism and, second, downwards to promote closer ‘people-to-people’ 
relations. Under President Xi, China is demonstrating an increased willingness to 
engage in regional multilateral organisations and processes. In the Southeast Asian 
context, China’s multilateral engagement is both Southeast Asia-specific (the 
principal driver here clearly being its strengthening relationship with ASEAN) and 
overlapping with the range of pan-Asia-Pacific agencies, including Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC). At the same time, the Chinese government has been 
actively promoting closer relations between Chinese societal organisations and their 
counterparts in neighbouring countries. A number of these involve semi-civil (i.e. civil 
society organisations (CSOs) that operate in the civil domain but remain regulated, 
approved and monitored by government ministries) bilateral ‘friendship associations’. 
These are, however, lodged within the overarching framework of the Chinese 
People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), which since 
1954 has been responsible for promoting friendly relations with other countries. 
Within this framework, China has also been evolving a more specific ‘foreign aid’ 
programme. Around half of the US$14.41bn that China claims it provided in foreign aid 
between 2010 and 2012 went to Africa (Xinhua 2014). Its cooperation focuses on 
infrastructure and technical capacity building through financing, providing goods and 
materials, project management, construction, sending medical teams and volunteers, offering 
emergency humanitarian aid, and reducing or exempting the debts of recipient countries. 
Between 2010 and 2012, China completed 580 such projects across 80 countries, focusing 
on infrastructure and agriculture. 
2.4 China and ASEAN development cooperation 
Between 2010 and 2015, China declared a range of development assistance initiatives at the 
various China-ASEAN Summits. The primary focus was on supporting infrastructure 
construction. Cambodia, for example, has received significant levels of assistance and 
Chinese corporate technical involvement. According to Cambodia’s Ministry of Mines and 
Energy, Chinese firms have invested more than US$1.6bn to build six dams with a combined 
capacity of 928MW (megawatts) in the country. The most recent, the sixth hydroelectric 
power facility (the 246MW Tatay River Hydropower Plant) was developed by the China 
National Heavy Machinery Corporation at a cost of US$540m under a 42-year build-operate-
transfer (BOT) contract with the Cambodian government (ASEAN-China Centre 2015b). 
October 2015 saw the inauguration of the Cambodia-China Friendship Chroy Changvar II 
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Bridge (a China-funded bridge across the Tonle Sap River) – the sixth bridge to be built in 
the country with Chinese aid. 
According to Xinhua’s press report on the event, ‘The 719-metre-long bridge… is designed to 
ease traffic flow in the capital city of Phnom Penh. It took China Road and Bridge 
Corporation 37 months to build under a concessional loan of 27.5 million US dollars from the 
Chinese government’ (ASEAN-China Centre 2015d). In late November 2015, the Anhui 
Foreign Economic Construction Group signed a contract with the Cambodian government to 
build offices for the leaders of the Cambodian Senate. China has provided grant aid of 
US$3.5m to Cambodia for this project (ASEAN-China Centre 2015c). 
China is involved with the construction of a large number of infrastructure projects in ASEAN 
countries. In Indonesia, in July 2015, Chinese officials declared China’s intention to expand 
two-way trade, aiming to increase China’s exports to US$150bn and imports from Indonesia 
to US$10m by 2020 (ASEAN-China Centre 2015f). 
Although there has been significant Chinese activity in Cambodia, Laos is also attracting 
Chinese development assistance. August 2015 saw construction begin on a railway linking 
Yuxi to Mohan, part of the China-Laos international railway. In addition, preparation work for 
Mengla airport is underway. The railway and airport are expected to be in use by 2020. 
However, these transport links need to be understood in the context of China’s own 
economic development aims. In particular, the Chinese government has been driving 
regional development in China’s Yunnan Province, building a new critical mass of economic 
infrastructure to diversify the country’s economic base and promote regional development. 
The Yunnan hub is critical to this strategy, and the various developmental projects being 
initiated with Laos and Myanmar are important means by which China can pursue and meet 
its development goals in Yunnan. In Myanmar, China has financed and built two pipelines 
carrying gas and oil – traversing the whole of Myanmar from coastal port (also Chinese-
financed and built) to the Chinese border – to fuel the new industrial hub in Yunnan. In 
October 2015, China announced an investment of US$31.4bn in a pilot economic zone on 
the border with Laos. The investment is intended to cover more than 240 projects including 
transportation, education and energy for the Mengla zone in Xishuangbanna Dai 
Autonomous Prefecture in Yunnan Province, according to the Provincial Development and 
Reform Commission and the Xishuangbanna government. The 4,500km2 zone includes an 
economic development park at Mohan on the border. The zone will focus on agriculture, 
biological industries, processing, logistics and cultural tourism (ASEAN-China Centre 2015e). 
The agriculture sector provides a good example of China’s involvement. Beginning in 2010, 
ASEAN and China have collaborated in this sector through the China-ASEAN Action Plan on 
Comprehensive Food Productivity Enhancement. Reflecting China’s emphasis on technical 
cooperation and knowledge transfers, it has established 20 experimental research stations 
for improved crop varieties, with demonstration areas totalling 1 million hectares. It has also 
built three agricultural technology demonstration centres in ASEAN countries and sent 300 
agricultural experts and technicians to provide technical advice and support. It has set up 
cross-border monitoring stations for animal and plant disease prevention and control, and 
established a new system for joint prevention and control of cross-border epidemics. 
The Chinese government also notes that it has sought to facilitate capacity building in 
ASEAN. Between 2010 and 2013, China trained more than 5,000 officials and technicians in 
ASEAN member countries. The training included business conferences and exhibitions, 
culture and arts, Chinese language, finance and taxation, traditional medicine, control and 
treatment of infectious diseases, new energy, as well as agriculture. This study has already 
noted the importance and potential for triangular cooperation. China’s 2014 White Paper 
states that it is ‘piloting’ trilateral cooperation. China, the United Nations Development 
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Programme (UNDP) and Cambodia launched a cooperation project to increase cassava 
exports on the basis of a successful training course on cassava planting techniques. 
However, China’s support for the agricultural sector is controversial; some have criticised its 
motives for being less about philanthropy and more about self-interest linked to the Beijing 
government’s definition of its present and future food security. After decades of pursuing a 
policy of self-sufficiency, China is now a major importer of food (OECD 2013). Chinese 
agricultural firms have grasped the ‘going out’ policy firmly in Africa and elsewhere. As in 
Africa, Chinese firms in ASEAN countries are accused of ‘land grabs’ to the cost of local 
farmers. 
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3 Analysis: explaining China’s Southeast 
Asian relations 
There are two interrelated debates: over China’s foreign policy and over its development 
policy. The first centres on the question of whether it is adopting a more assertive, higher-
octane approach, fuelled by its evident domestic needs, expanding regional interests and 
domestic political pressure from advocates of just such an approach. Or do China’s policies 
simply demonstrate Beijing’s balancing of what it sees as its legitimate ‘rights’ with its 
commitments to regional cooperation, equality, inclusivity and reciprocity. The second debate 
concerns whether China’s approach to development in Southeast Asia is beneficial for or 
detrimental to the region’s economic and political wellbeing. 
In terms of the first of these debates, evidence shows that opinion is divided, even within 
China’s elite policy establishment. François Godement’s careful evaluation of a 2013 
roundtable of Chinese and international experts held at the China Institutes of Contemporary 
International Relations (CICIR) explains that the presentations ‘show that Chinese thought 
on foreign policy is still divided, with quite a few discordant notes’ (Godement 2014: 1). 
China’s policy and practice in Southeast Asia, as elsewhere, is framed by its political 
discourse. This emphasises a series of core foreign policy principles. These include Peaceful 
Development and a Harmonious World (Government of China 2007) and the values of 
political equality, mutual benefit, ‘win-win’ cooperation, cultural exchange, and non-
interference. Central to this enduring discourse are the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence put forward by Premier Zhou Enlai during negotiations with India in December 
1953: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; non-
interference in internal affairs of other states; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful 
coexistence. The Asian-African Conference, held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, adopted 
Ten Principles for Conducting International Relations, which represented a continuation and 
development of the Five Principles (Ministry of Foreign Affairs n.d.). 
China’s engagement with Southeast Asia can be explained by six factors: 
1. Unease at home and abroad over the sustainability of its economic growth rate and 
potential knock-on impact on international markets. 
2. Domestic political concerns over a perceived drift in China’s policy towards the region 
under the previous leadership of President Hu Jintao – specifically, a failure to 
recognise the currents of change in the region and the potential for China’s position 
of influence to be weakened. 
3. The national priorities and resulting policies of party and State established under 
President Xi Jinping’s leadership. 
4. The overall economic strength of ASEAN and the impending establishment of the 
ASEAN Economic Community. 
5. The increased scale of China’s economic involvement in the region in recent years. 
6. Southeast Asia’s return to the forefront of US foreign policy priorities, exemplified by 
the Obama administration’s ‘pivot’ strategy, which provides an important context of 
geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic competition for China’s ‘neighbourhood 
policy’. 
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4 Key findings 
1. China’s current foreign relations with Southeast Asia have five characteristics:        
(1) foreign and development policies towards the region are increased priorities for 
China under President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang; (2) China’s recent 
approach is much more proactive and innovative, rooted in the new diplomacy of 
China’s ‘neighbourhood policy’; (3) this new diplomacy is evident in the MSR and 
AIIB initiatives; (4) China’s approach to international development (or ‘foreign aid’) is 
relatively new and still evolving, but differs substantially from traditional donors; (5) all 
of China’s recent endeavours to ‘court’ Southeast Asia – most clearly demonstrated 
by its concerted programme of leadership and high-level diplomatic tours in 2013 – 
have been compromised by territorial disputes and ill-advised ADIZ action. 
2. China invests sizeable funding in Southeast Asia’s economic development through 
international development assistance (‘foreign aid’) to ASEAN and individual states. 
This includes technical support and funding for infrastructure, social welfare and 
humanitarian assistance. The wider economic-based approach adopted by China, 
emphasising trade and investment, offers opportunities for increased national income 
generation as well as critical access to the value chains operated by Chinese 
enterprises. However, ensuring that local production bases are not fatally 
compromised by expanding Chinese corporate presence and onward ‘third country’ 
exports is far from simple. Weighing the acceptable boundaries for free-market 
competition against protective instincts towards local national producers and national 
interests and priorities is the most pressing policy challenge, and is likely to become 
even more urgent in the context of the evolving CAFTA and AEC, and the emerging 
MSR project. 
3. Weighted against the potential for a positive Chinese contribution are the negative 
costs of unresolved territorial disputes, regionally destabilising Chinese unilateralism, 
and weak Chinese corporate social responsibility (CSR). The territorial disputes are 
not likely to be resolved in the near future given the tensions of 2014–15 and the 
limitations posed by potential for loss of face. In the meantime, governments are 
placing their hopes on negotiating a code of conduct to manage the South China Sea 
disputes, albeit with growing frustration over a perceived slowness in China’s 
engagement in the negotiating process. China’s declaration of the ADIZ merely 
served to intensify regional antipathy and apprehension. In addition, mounting civil 
society protests in countries such as Myanmar over alleged Chinese corporate 
environmental degradation, lack of transparency, minimal knowledge and skills 
transfers, company secrecy, imported workforces and claims of corruption all 
represent part of a growing agenda of problems for the Chinese government. China’s 
recent guidelines on CSR are a welcome step along the road but, as simply non-
enforceable ‘guidelines’, do not go far enough; regulatory policies are required for 
Chinese firms operating internationally. 
4. To increase potential gains and minimise possible costs, Southeast Asian 
governments and ASEAN need to maximise their countervailing bargaining power 
with China. This can reasonably be undertaken through diversification policies and 
strategies and, in terms of development policies, placing greater emphasis on 
triangular cooperation. Evidently enough, ASEAN has a multilateral approach to 
relations with China, whether this is in terms of attaining a diplomatic resolution to the 
various territorial disputes its members have with China or in terms of economic 
development. China’s ‘new diplomacy’ and emerging interest in multilateralism 
notwithstanding, Beijing still prefers its traditional and comfortable approach of 
bilateral relations. 
 However, China’s approach has to change, not least because of the pressure that 
comes from both the regional and global dynamics of globalisation – a point 
recognised in recent leadership comments following the so-called ‘Great Fall of 
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China’ stock market and financial crash in mid-2015. Drawing in development 
agencies from the OECD-DAC membership, together with China, carries potential 
benefits for all stakeholders. These include knowledge exchange, shared experiences 
and, in terms of this particular region, recognition of continuing post-independence 
relationships of a number of states grounded in their shared former colonial status – 
for example, those retaining membership of the Commonwealth group of states. 
5. China, ASEAN and Southeast Asia’s LDCs are well placed to take up the 
opportunities presented by the post-2015 global development agenda and SDGs to 
scale up triangular cooperation in the region. Two key interconnected meetings in 
2015 served to underline the growing importance of triangular cooperation and its 
emerging centrality to the post-2015 development agenda. The first was the High-
level Meeting on South-South and Triangular Cooperation in the Post-2015 
Development Agenda: Financing for Development in the South and Technology 
Transfer, held in May in Dhaka. The second was the High-level Multi-stakeholders 
Strategy Forum, in late August in Macao, which focused on ‘Scaling-up Global 
Support for South-South and Triangular Cooperation in the Context of the Post-2015 
Development Agenda’. Together with the United Nations Outcome Document for the 
SDGs, the decisions and resulting post-2015 implementation strategies from these 
meetings hold a pivotal role for Southeast Asia and particularly for China’s future 
approach to development. China’s Foreign Aid White Paper 2014 describes China as 
presently ‘piloting’ triangular cooperation. However, as the 19 volumes of successful 
casework projects collected and collated by UNOSSC and China’s continuing 
collaborative ‘A-B-C’ triangular development project in Africa testifies, the 
‘experimental’ test phase is, in all probability, now over. It is both timely and 
opportune for China to revisit its policy portfolio in order to ‘scale up’ its commitment 
to, and programme for, triangular cooperation. 
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5 Recommendations 
There are five recommendations arising from this report. 
1. The Southeast Asian LDCs and ASEAN should actively pursue economic 
diversification policies and strategies to counterbalance China’s growing economic 
and political presence. 
2. The development policies of Southeast Asian countries, ASEAN and China should be 
harmonised in order to prioritise, promote and facilitate greater trilateral cooperation, 
involving China within the context of the post-2015 global and regional development 
agenda and SDGs. 
3. Extra value-added for the regional actors can be attained through robust advocacy 
and facilitation of ‘bottom-up’ participation of local producers in Chinese ‘value 
chains for development’. Local producers should be brought into the development of 
policies and operational strategies. This will actively promote greater mainstreaming 
of grassroots enterprises into Chinese corporate value chains. Regional, national and 
sub-national actors should work in concert through the 10+1 and 10+3 dialogue 
processes to facilitate such mainstreaming. 
4. The role of civil society in Southeast Asia in contributing to a strengthening of 
countervailing bargaining power should be actively recognised by governments and 
regional associations. The example of civil society dialogue and cooperation in 
Myanmar under the reform process is instructive and encouraging. It demonstrates 
that coordinated mass popular protest with a high media profile, combined with 
constructive dialogue with government agencies, can make a difference in increasing 
pressure for corporate compliance with CSR norms and practices. 
5. The Chinese government’s development approach can be facilitated by a 
strengthening of the CSR Guidelines (which are currently voluntary and subject to 
highly variable compliance within China and internationally) to a mandatory regulatory 
and monitoring system. Buttressing this would be a Chinese commitment to full 
implementation of the UN Business and Human Rights principles to which it has 
recently become a signatory. This recommendation can form a key dialogue stream – 
for instance, in the ASEAN-China Development Forum process as well as the Silk 
Road Forum, which brings together representatives from government, business, 
labour, non-government organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations 
(CBOs) and the media. 
  
25 
References 
ASEAN (2015) ‘ASEAN, China Reaffirm Commitment to Strategic Partnership’, ASEAN 
Secretariat News, 8 June, www.asean.org/asean-china-reaffirm-commitment-to-strategic-
partnership/ (accessed 24 February 2016) 
ASEAN (2014) ‘ASEAN-China Free Trade Area’, www.asean.org/communities/asean-
economic-community/item/asean-china-free-trade-area-2 (accessed 12 June 2015) 
ASEAN (2002) ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’, 
www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-
the-south-china-sea (accessed 7 July 2014) 
ASEAN-China Centre (2015a) ‘China to Provide 560 mln USD Free Assistance to 
Underdeveloped ASEAN Countries in 2016’, 23 November, based on Xinhua News Release, 
www.asean-china-center.org/english/2015–11/23/c_134844531.htm (accessed 14 January 
2016) 
ASEAN-China Centre (2015b) ‘6th Chinese-built Hydropower Plant in Cambodia Begins 
Operation’, www.asean-china-center.org/english/2015–12/24/c_134947454.htm (accessed 
25 February 2016) 
ASEAN-China Centre (2015c) ‘China Provides Grant Aid of 3.5 mln USD to Cambodia’, 
www.asean-china-center.org/english/2015–12/02/c_134876695.htm (accessed 2 February 
2016) 
ASEAN-China Centre (2015d) ‘Cambodian PM Inaugurates China-funded Bridge in Capital 
City’, www.asean-china-center.org/english/2015–10/22/c_134740027.htm (accessed          
12 January 2016) 
ASEAN-China Centre (2015e) ‘China Plans 31 bln USD Investment for Border Zone with 
Laos’, www.asean-china-center.org/english/2015–10/20/c_134731264.htm (accessed         
24 December 2015) 
ASEAN-China Centre (2015f) ‘Widodo Hopes China to Build Indonesia into an Asia 
Production Base’, www.asean-china-center.org/english/2015-07/28/c_134454457.htm 
(accessed 12 January 2016) 
ASEAN-China Centre (2015g) ‘Interview: China, ASEAN to Deepen Cooperation, Upgrade 
FTA, says Chinese Ambassador’, www.asean-china-center.org/english/2013–
10/09/c_132782529.htm (accessed 7 January 2016) 
Asia Pacific Defence Forum (2014) ‘ASEAN Airs Concern over China’s New Maritime Zone’, 
30 January, http://apdforum.com/en_GB/article/rmiap/articles/online/features/2014/ 
01/30/asean-china-maritime (accessed 10 March 2014) 
BBC News (2001) ‘Analysis: South-East Asia’s Chinese’, 29 August, 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1514916.stm (accessed 20 August 2014) 
Bloomberg Business (2014) ‘South China Sea Tensions Flare After Boat Collision, Arrests’,  
7 May, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-07/china-loses-contact-with-11-
fishermen-off-disputed-islands (accessed 24 February 2016) 
Bloomberg Business (2012) ‘China Trade Slowdown Shows Xi Must Fuel Consumption’,     
10 December, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012–12-09/china-rebound-accelerates-
as-xi-confronts-8–1-unemployment-rate (accessed 25 February 2016) 
26 
Brant, P. (2014) ‘China’s Foreign Aid White Paper: Quick Overview’, The Interpreter, 10 July, 
Lowy Institute, www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/07/10/China-Foreign-Aid-White-Paper-
overview.aspx (accessed 7 January 2016) 
Brunei Times (2014) ‘China to Counter Vietnam’s “Slander”’, 11 June, www.bt.com.bn/news-
asia/2014/06/11/china-counter-vietnam%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98slander%E2%80%99 
(accessed 7 June 2015) 
Bush III, R.C. (2012) ‘The Response of China’s Neighbours to the U.S. “Pivot” to Asia’, 
Speech, 31 January, Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 
www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2012/01/31-us-pivot-bush (accessed 22 December 
2013) 
Campbell, K. and Andrews, B. (2013) Explaining the US ‘Pivot’ to Asia, London: Chatham 
House, 
www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Americas/0813pp_pivotto
asia.pdf (accessed 24 February 2016) 
CBI (2011) China’s Twelfth Five Year Plan (2011–2015) – the Full English Version, 11 May, 
http://cbi.typepad.com/china_direct/2011/05/chinas-twelfth-five-new-plan-the-full-english-
version.html#sthash.rFAFNwLb.dpuf (accessed 12 June 2012) 
Chan, S. (ed.) (2013) The Morality of China in Africa: The Middle Kingdom and the Dark 
Continent, London: Zed Books 
Chang, A. (2013) Beijing and the Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia: To Serve the People, 
NBR Special Report 43, Washington DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 
www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=651 (accessed 22 December 2015) 
China Daily USA (2015) ‘Potential of the Chinese Dream’, Beijing, 26 March, 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-03/26/content_17380146.htm (accessed 5 January 
2015) 
China Daily (2014) ‘Forum Analyses ASEAN’s Funding Requirements’, 23 September, 
www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/2014-09/23/content_18642821.htm (accessed                  
24 September 2014) 
China Daily (2013) ‘China’s Neighbourhood Diplomacy Promotes Regional Peace’,               
3 November, www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013–11/03/content_17077732.htm (accessed 
15 June 2015) 
China Daily (2012) ‘Higher Costs Forcing Chinese Firms to Relocate to Southeast Asia’, 22 
October, https://sg.entertainment.yahoo.com/news/higher-costs-forcing-chinese-firms-
relocate-southeast-asia-091002927.html (accessed 24 April 2015) 
Daily Telegraph (2014) ‘Violent Anti-China Protests Spread Across Vietnam’, 14 May, 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/vietnam/10830569/Violent-anti-China-protests-
spread-across-Vietnam.html (accessed 15 July 2014) 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2015) Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership, Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/Pages/regional-comprehensive-economic-
partnership.aspx (accessed 5 January 2016) 
 
27 
Dobbs, R.; Pohl, H.; Lin, D.-Y.; Mischke, J.; Garemo, N.; Hexter, J.; Matzinger, S.; Palter, R. 
and Nanavatty, R. (2013) Infrastructure Productivity: How to Save $1 Trillion a Year, 
McKinsey Global Institute, www.mckinsey.com/industries/infrastructure/our-
insights/infrastructure-productivity (accessed 23 December 2015) 
DevPolicy (n.d.) ‘2012 Aid in Volume’, figure cited in Murphy, T. (2014) ‘What Does China’s 
White Paper Tell Us About its Foreign Aid Spending?’, Humanosphere, 14 July, 
www.humanosphere.org/world-politics/2014/07/chinas-white-paper-tell-us-foreign-aid-
spending/ (accessed 24 February 2016) 
Drysdale, P. (2011) ‘South Asia and Asia’s middle-class future’, East Asia Forum,               
28 November, www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/11/28/south-asia-and-asias-middle-class-future/ 
(accessed 27 April 2015) 
Du, R.Y. (2014) ‘China Territorial Deadlocks Hurt Regional Trade’, Global Risk Insights, 
http://globalriskinsights.com/ 2014/06/china-territorial-deadlocks-hurt-regional-trade/ 
(accessed 15 July 2014) 
Duchâtel, M.; Bräuner, O. and Hang, Z. (2014) Protecting China’s Overseas Interests: The 
Slow Shift Away from Non-Interference, SIPRI Policy Paper 41, Sweden: Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP41.pdf 
(accessed 20 July 2015) 
Godement, F. (2014) ‘China’s Neighbourhood Policy’, ECFR/Asia Centre, 
www.ecfr.eu/page/-/China_Analysis_China_s_Neighbourhood_Policy_February2014.pdf 
(accessed 5 June 2015) 
Government of China (2014) China’s Foreign Aid (2014), Beijing: Information Office of the 
State Council, The People’s Republic of China, July, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-07/10/c_133474011.htm (accessed 19 August 
2015) 
Government of China (2007) China’s Sincere Hope for a Harmonious World, Beijing: Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 17 October, www.china.org.cn/english/congress/228536.htm (accessed  
20 December 2015) 
Gu, J.; Zhang, X.; Li, X. and Bloom, G. (eds) (2014) ‘China and International Development: 
Challenges and Opportunities’, IDS Bulletin 45.4: 1–5, 
http://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/idsbo/issue/view/22 (accessed 21 March 2016) 
Information Office of the State Council (IOSC) (2014) White Paper on Foreign Aid 2014, 
Beijing: Government of People’s Republic of China 
Li, K. (2014) 李克强 政府工作报告:抓紧规划建设丝绸之路经济带、21世纪海上 丝绸之路. 
Government Work Report: Pay Close Attention to the Planning and Construction of the Silk 
Road Economic Zone and Maritime Silk Road in the 21st Century, 北京: 十二届全国人大二次
会议 Beijing: Second Session of the Twelfth NPC, State Council of People’s Republic of 
China 
Lu, S. (2012) ‘Some Thoughts on the New Strategic Partnership between China and Africa’, 
Speech given at the Institute of International Strategy at Party School of the Central 
Committee of the CPC, 19 September, cited in Duchâtel, M.; Bräuner, O. and Hang, Z. 
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